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THURSDAY'S CHILDt: LITIGATION OVER
POSSESSION OF CRYOPRESERVED EMBRYOS
AS A CALL FOR LEGISLATION
Jennifer Hodges*
I. INTRODUCTION
Louise Joy Brown, the first child born through in vitro
fertilization (IVF),' celebrated her twenty-first birthday on
July 25, 1999.2 Since her birth, IVF technology has been her-
alded as the answer to the prayers of many infertile couples,
allowing them an alternative to either childlessness or adop-
tion.3 In the last twenty years, 300,000 other children besides
Louise have been born worldwide from the same or similar
procedure.4 Currently, approximately 15,000 births result
annually from IVF in the United States alone.5 The assisted
t
Monday's child is fair of face, Tuesday's child is full of grace, Wednes-
day's child is full of woe, Thursday's child has far to go, Friday's child is
loving and giving, Saturday's child works hard for a living, but the
child that is born on the Sabbath Day is bonny and blithe and good and
gay.
THE REAL MOTHER GOOSE 87 (Rand McNally & Co. Chicago ed. 1985).
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 40. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., University of California, Santa
Cruz.
1. Literally, "fertilization in glass." In vitro fertilization is a procedure in
which ova (eggs) are extracted from women and fertilized in a petri dish with
sperm. Once the ova are fertilized, the resulting embryos are either placed into
a woman's uterus, hopefully resulting in a pregnancy, or frozen for use in the
future. See, e.g., ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION,
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 89 (1995); MARY
WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY 4 (1985).
2. See Lori Andrews et al., ART into Science: Regulation of Fertility Tech-
niques; Assisted Reproductive Technology, 281 SCI. 651, 651 (1998).
3. See Sherylynn Fiandaca, Comment, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryos:
The Need for International Guidelines, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 337, 339 (1998).
4. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 651.
5. See id.
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reproductive technology (ART) industry, in seeking to provide
a solution to couples desperate to have a child, has become big
business, currently serving an estimated one in six infertile
couples and taking in an annual revenue of approximately $2
billion.'
Along with the promise of this relatively new technology
has come a host of moral, ethical, and legal problems. Cryo-
preservation, or the freezing of embryos7 for later use, is one
example of an area of ART that has opened the door to
speculation, litigation, and concern.8 For example, because
cryopreservation allows embryos generated by IVF to exist
outside the womb for an indefinite period of time,9 its use has
sparked a vigorous debate over whether such "frozen em-
bryos" are best considered persons or property. ° Differing
viewpoints as to the appropriate characterization of frozen
embryos have had a dramatic effect on the outcome of IVF
litigation." Further, concerns as to other implications of the
procedure, such as the proper period of storage and the mo-
rality of destruction and experimentation on cryopreserved
embryos, have also surfaced.
2
Complicating the debate is the fact that the ART field is
largely unregulated." There are several reasons why the in-
dustry remains insulated from the regulations with which
other fields of medicine must comply. 4 First, because of fall-
out from the abortion debate, embryo and fetal research is ex-
cluded from federal funding.15 Therefore, unlike other institu-
tions that do receive government funding, IVF clinics are not
6. See id.
7. Many terms are used to refer to cryopreserved embryos: embryos, frozen
embryos, fertilized ova, fertilized zygotes, pre-embryos, and blastocysts. This
comment uses these terms interchangeably; no implication is intended by the
choice of any particular term at any given place in the text.
8. See Fiandaca, supra note 3, at 339.
9. See Bill E. Davidoff, Comment, Frozen Embryos: A Need for Thawing in
the Legislative Process, 47 SMU L. REv. 131, 134 (1993).
10. See Fiandaca, supra note 3, at 340. See also Nicole L. Cucci, Notes,
Constitutional Implications of In Vitro Fertilization Procedures, 72 St. JOHN'S L.
REV. 417, 434-36 (1998).
11. See Cucci, supra note 10, at 434-36.
12. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 651.
13. See id. ART is among the least regulated medical specialties in the
United States. Most notably, unlike Europe, the United States does not require
that fertility clinics be licensed. See Michael D. Lemonick, The New Revolution
in Making Babies, TIME, Dec. 1, 1997, at 40.




required to form institutional review boards (IRBs)."6 Second,
while some protections do generally exist for embryonic ex-
perimentation, many reproductive technologists are not sub-
ject to sanctions for misbehavior, unlike researchers in other
fields, because they practice in private clinics." Perhaps as a
result of the lack of regulation, the ART industry has been ac-
cused of a multitude of transgressions, including "experimen-
tation without appropriate review, use of embryos without
consent, inadequate informed consent, conflicts regarding
control over stored gametes18 and embryos, and failure to rou-
tinely screen donors for disease."9
This comment focuses on just one problem raised by the
implementation of IVF technology: determining the disposi-
tion of frozen embryos when the gamete donors undergo a
change in circumstances, such as divorce. Part II examines
the various legal theories regarding the status of frozen em-
bryos. In reviewing a number of differing viewpoints, this
comment addresses the impact of each perspective on the par-
ties involved in the IVF process: the gamete donors, the clin-
ics, and the embryos themselves. This comment does not fo-
cus on whether life begins at the point of fertilization, because
that question carries with it a myriad of potentially unresolv-
able ethical, moral, and religious concerns.0 Rather, this
comment focuses on the legal implications of holding that this
is so. Part II also provides a background of the technical as-
pects of the IVF procedure. Part III identifies the problem
presented by the lack of uniform standards for resolving IVF
disputes. Part IV analyzes the major viewpoints in more de-
tail, discussing the potential impact of the implementation of
each theory. Finally, Part V proposes a legislative solution
that takes the decision-making power about the disposition of
embryos out of the hands of the courts, and places it with the
couples who undergo IVF.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. "Gametes" refers to both sperm and eggs.
19. Andrews, supra note 2, at 652.
20. Generally, the question of whether an embryo constitutes life has been
viewed as beyond the scope of the courts. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Technology: The IVF Procedure and Cryopreservation
of Resulting Embryos
The IVF procedure is sought by couples who wish to have
a child but cannot reproduce successfully by means of sexual
intercourse." The problem may stem from a number of
sources, such as low sperm motility, failure to produce ova
(eggs), or physical damage to the fallopian tubes or uterus.2
In order to overcome these obstacles, it is necessary to fertil-
ize the ova outside the woman's body and subsequently im-
plant the resulting embryos in her uterus."
The first step in IVF is the collection, or "harvesting," of
healthy ova from the woman's ovaries.24 First, egg production
is stimulated through the use of fertility drugs, which cause
the woman to produce a higher-than-normal number of eggs
and also allow a certain amount of control over the timing of
ovulation to facilitate the optimal scheduling of the retrieval
procedure.25 The production of multiple eggs is known as "su-
perovulation," 6 and may result in the harvesting of as many
as fifteen to forty eggs per cycle.2"
This bounty does not come without a price. Fertility
drugs can cause mood swings, bloating, and pain, and can
even frustrate subsequent implantation of embryos by irri-
tating the uterine lining. 8 The harvest itself is traditionally
21. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS, 956-59 (2d ed. 1991).
22. See id.
23. See id. For simplicity's sake, this overview of the IVF procedure as-
sumes it takes place using the gametes (eggs and sperm) provided by a hetero-
sexual married couple for the purpose of implanting the resulting embryos in
the wife's uterus. However, this is not the only scenario in the real world of as-
sisted reproductive technologies. Since any viable gametes and uterus can con-
ceivably be used, a successful fertilization and implantation can encompass any
number of different scenarios, including a recent California example in which a
child was conceived using a donor egg, donor sperm, and a surrogate mother.
See In Re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
24. Davidoff, supra note 9, at 134.
25. THE JOHNS HOPKINS HANDBOOK OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 153 (Marian D. Damewood, M.D. ed.
1996).
26. Id. at 153. See also Davidoff, supra note 9, at 134.
27. ROBYN ROWLAND, LIVING LABORATORIES: WOMEN AND REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 19, 22-23 (1992).
28. See Robert M.L. Winston & Alan H. Handyside, New Challenges in Hu-
man In Vitro Fertilization; Scientific and Ethical Difficulties, 260 SCI. 932, 932.
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performed under general anesthesia via laparoscopy, an ex-
traction of eggs from the woman's ovaries through incisions
made in her abdominal wall.29 More recently, the procedure
has been performed under local anesthesia using ultrasound
to guide a needle through the woman's bladder and into the
ovary.3" This process may require repeated penetration in or-
der to collect all of the available eggs.3 Ultrasound-assisted
transvaginal extraction, which does not entail penetrating the
abdomen, may also be used. However, this procedure is not
favored because it is more difficult to perform than laparo-
scopic surgery and yields fewer eggs."
The second step in IVF is the fertilization of the success-
fully retrieved eggs with the man's sperm in a petri dish.33 In
some cases, particularly those in which sperm motility is a
factor, doctors may use a more invasive technique called "mi-
cro-injection,"34 injecting the sperm directly into the eggs in
order to facilitate fertilization. 5 After fertilization, the eggs
are allowed to develop to the four- to eight-cell stage, at which
point they may be transferred into the woman's uterus
through a catheter.36 Ideally, one or more embryos will then
implant in the uterine lining and result in a pregnancy.
Due to the physically and emotionally taxing nature of
this proceduire',37 many couples who undergo IVF choose to
freeze, or cryopreserve, any extra, unimplanted embryos for
future use in case the initial IVF procedure fails to produce a
pregnancy.38 Further, because of the low success rate of IVF39
and the fact that almost no insurance carriers cover its
costs,4" freezing avoids the cost of repeated aspirations and
29. See ROWLAND, supra note 27, at 25.
30. See id. at 26.
31. See id. at 27.
32. See id. at 28.
33. See id. at 19.
34. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 652. "Only recently has it been observed
that children born after this procedure are twice as likely to have major con-
genital abnormalities as children conceived naturally." Id.
35. See id.
36. See Cucci, supra note 10, at 421.
37. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 651.
38. For a complete discussion of cryopreservation of embryos, see Alan
Trounson, Preservation of Human Eggs and Embryos, FERTILITY & STERILITY,
July 1986, at 1.
39. In the United States, the overall birth rate per IVF treatment cycle is
14%. See Winston & Handyside, supra note 28, at 932.
40. See Annette Miller et al., Baby Makers Inc., NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1992,
1999]
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transfers.41 Given that a single IVF procedure currently costs
approximately $8000,42 with no guarantees for success, cryo-
preservation may represent a substantial savings to a couple
forced to undergo multiple implantations before succeeding in
a pregnancy.
However, cryopreservation may present a host of legal
problems, particularly since the individual circumstances of
the gamete donors are likely to change over time." Divorce,
death, incapacitation, aging, birth of other children, or finan-
cial considerations may cause one or both parties to change
their minds about continuing with implantation. 4 Even a
successful implantation and birth through IVF may create
"loose ends," leaving behind an unintended legacy of cryopre-
served embryos that are no longer wanted or needed by the
couple who chose to create them.45 Also, given the flexibility
of IVF to involve multiple parties such as egg donors, sperm
donors, and surrogate mothers, as many as five individuals
can potentially claim a valid legal interest in the disposition
of any single embryo.46
B. The Line of Litigation: Davis v. Davis as an Overview
Relatively little litigation exists surrounding the IVF
procedure and the disposition of cryogenically preserved em-
bryos.47 Speculations about the reasons for the seeming lack
of controversy are numerous, ranging from the novelty of the
technology 8 to lack of interest on the part of the patients and
at 38, 39.
41. See Jennifer L. Carow, Note, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception
to An Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Procreational Freedom and Reproduc-
tive Technology, 43 DEPAuL L. REV. 523, 529 (1994). Because "the IVF process
is costly.., the fewer egg retrievals a woman undergoes the better." Id.
42. See Michael D. Lemonick, The New Revolution in Making Babies, TIME,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 40. The actual cost to patients is increased due to the fact that
most private insurers in the United States refuse to cover IVF. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Id.; see also Rita Rubin, 100,000 Frozen Embryos, USA TODAY, Dec. 8,
1998, at 1A.
46. See In Re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72. Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998).
47. "We have no case law to guide us . . . there are apparently very few
other litigated cases involving... 'frozen embryos.'" Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d
588, 590 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911
(1993).
48. See Tanya Feliciano, Davis v. Davis: What About Future Disputes?, 26
CONN. L. REV. 305, 312 (1993).
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doctors involved,49 especially with regard to the disposition of
remaining embryos after a successful pregnancy." With re-
gard to medical malpractice suits, the high failure rate of
IVF 1 may itself be a contributing factor to the lack of litiga-
tion since it may be difficult for patients to discern whether a
failure is due to negligence or simply inherent risks of the
procedure.2 The situation is further complicated because
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the poten-
tial legal status of embryos, such as Roe v. Wade"3 and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,54 are distinguishable in that
they focus on women's rights to terminate pregnancies."6 Be-
cause frozen IVF embryos have yet to be implanted, their ex-
istence does not necessarily constitute a "pregnancy." Thus,
the discretion given to a woman's right to choose to have an
abortion under Roe and Casey cannot be readily expanded to
grant women analogous unilateral decision-making power in
deciding the fate of unimplanted embryos. 6
Nonetheless, the cases actually adjudicated offer at least
some insight into the various viewpoints used by courts in de-
termining how to resolve the disposition of frozen embryos.
Foremost among these cases is Davis v. Davis,7 which trial,
appellate, and state supreme court decisions neatly encom-
pass the three major views of IVF-produced embryos: frozen
embryos as persons with associated legal rights,58 as prop-
erty,59 and as neither persons nor property." Because the
Davis cases encompass all three of these views, they serve as
a convenient backdrop for analyzing the moral, ethical, and
49. See Trounson, supra note 38, at 1.
50. See id.
51. See Winston & Handyside, supra note 28, at 932.
52. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 651.
53. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
54. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994).
55. At least one court has relied on this distinction in addressing the dispo-
sition of cryopreserved embryos: "The Court understands that ... Roe ... dealt
with the constitutionality of abortion statutes and the Court's decisions in those
cases have a profound effect on the states' compelling interest in the protection
of human life, but only as it deals with the abortion issue." Davis v. Davis, No.
E-14496, 1989 WL 140495, at *10 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180,
1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), affd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.
1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
56. See id.
57. Davis, supra note 55.
58. See Davis, 1989 WL 140495, at *11.
59. See Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *3.
60. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
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legal problems currently posed by the cryopreservation of em-
bryos.6
C. Davis v. Davis at the Trial Court: The "Embryo as Person"
View
The Davis dispute marked the only point of contention in
the Tennessee divorce proceedings between Mary Sue and
Junior Davis: the disposition of seven cryogenically preserved
embryos that were the result of an IVF attempt in December
1988.62 Although the Davises were informed about the tech-
nical aspects of IVF and cryopreservation," the clinic assist-
ing the Davises in their IVF procedure neglected to seek their
consent as to the future disposition of the embryos. 4 Al-
though the clinic did ordinarily use consent forms that ad-
dressed the implications of storage and the possibility of do-
nating embryos to an infertile couple,65 the Davises never
signed the forms, nor did they reach any definitive agreement
prior to the procedure about either storage or donation.66
At the trial court level, Mary Sue wished to preserve the
embryos in order to implant them in her uterus and continue
her attempt to become pregnant. Junior wished to have the
embryos destroyed. 7 In resolving the dispute, the trial court
adopted the "embryo as person" view, awarding "custody" of
the embryos to Mary Sue.68
In arriving at its decision, the trial court relied heavily on
the expert testimony of French geneticist, Dr. Jerome Le-
jeune. 9 The court gave much consideration to the distinction
between categorizing the Davises' embryos as "embryos" or
"pre-embryos," and the resulting differences in legal analysis
that the court saw as stemming from the application of those
terms. °
61. See Feliciano, supra note 48, at 314.
62. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
63. See id. at 592.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 592 n.9.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 589.
68. See Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept.
21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd,
842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911
(1993).
69. See id. at *4.
70. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593.
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Despite contrary testimony by Dr. Irving Ray King, the
gynecologist who performed the IVF procedures in the Davis
case,' and a report by the American Fertility Society,2 the
court aligned itself with the reasoning of Dr. Lejeune, who in-
sisted that there was no scientifically recognized distinction
between the embryos and pre-embryos.7'3 Dr. Lejeune instead
referred to the four- to eight-cell structures as "early human
beings," "tiny persons," and even as "kin. 74 The court, in ac-
cordance, held that from the moment of conception the em-
bryos were "human beings, " awarding custody to Mary Sue,
whom the court determined should be "permitted the oppor-
tunity to bring these children to term through implanta-
tion. ,7 In justifying its decision, the trial court cited the doc-
trine of parens patrie,77 holding that it was "in the best
interest of the children" to have the opportunity to be born in-
stead of being destroyed.8
This line of reasoning, that an embryo is a human being
from the moment of conception and deserves protection
whether or not it is implanted in a woman's uterus, is sup-
ported not only by the Catholic church, 9 but also by Louisi-
ana state law, 9 which declares outright that "[a]n in vitro fer-
71. See id. "[Dr. King] testified that the currently accepted term for the zy-
gote immediately after division is 'preembryo' and that this term applies up un-
til 14 days after fertilization. . . . [This] testimony was corroborated by the
other experts who testified at trial, with the exception of Dr. Lejeune." Id.
72. American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproduc-
tive Technologies, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY 6 (1990).
73. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593.
74. Id. For a disparaging commentary on Lejeune's testimony, see George
J. Annas, A French Homunculus in a Tennessee Court, 19 HASTINGS CTR. REP.
20(1989).
75. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
76. Id.
77. Parens patriae literally means "parent of the country." The doctrine re-
fers to the principle that the state must take care of those who are unable to
care for themselves. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
78. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594.
79. For a discussion of the Catholic Church's pro-life position, which has led
to its opposition of IVF, see James Glieck, The Vatican on Birth Science; Repro-
ductive Help: Widespread and Unregulated, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1987, at A16.
However, Father Richard McCormick, a noted Catholic bioethicist, has sug-
gested that prior to implantation an embryo is not an individual and therefore
not viewed as a person under Catholic theology. JOHN A. ROBERTSON,
CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES
102, 109 (1994).
80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-:133 (West 1999).
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tilized human ovum is a biological human being .... ,,1
However, critics point out that the implications of this
perspective are profound." Categorizing embryos as human
beings brings with it the necessity of allocating to them a
panoply of legal rights, ranging from the right to be im-
planted, as addressed in Davis,83 to the right to inherit prop-
erty.8" The granting of these legal rights to the embryo means
that its rights may at times supersede the rights of others,8
creating a ripple effect that in some cases may be in direct
conflict with existing law. For example, the court determina-
tion in Davis, that an embryo has a right to be implanted,
may mean that women like Mary Sue Davis who undergo IVF
could be forced to implant all of the embryos resulting from
the procedure. This result is in direct conflict with a
woman's right to privacy and bodily integrity under Roe v.
Wade," which explicitly concluded that "the unborn have
never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense."
88
D. Davis v. Davis at the Appellate Court: The "Embryo as
Property" View
The "embryo as person" view espoused by the Davis trial
court did not survive appeal. At the time of appeal, Mary Sue
Davis had remarried and no longer wanted to implant the
embryos in her own uterus. Instead, she wanted to donate
them to an infertile couple, while Junior still wanted them
destroyed."0
Although not directly referring to it as such, the Tennes-
see Court of Appeals adopted an "embryo as property" ap-
proach in resolving the dispute.9 The appellate court re-
versed the trial court's ruling on two grounds. First, the court
81. Id. § 9:126.
82. See Cucci, supra note 10, at 434.
83. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588.
84. See Mario J. Trespalacios, Comment, Frozen Embryos: Towards an Eq-
uitable Solution, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 803, 807 (1992).
85. See id. at 813.
86. See id.
87. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. Id. at 162.
89. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub
nom. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
90. See id.
91. See Trespalacios, supra note 84, at 813.
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found that awarding the embryos to Mary Sue for implanta-
tion against Junior's will constituted "impermissible state ac-
tion in violation of Junior's constitutionally protected right
not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place."92
Second, the court found no basis under Tennessee law for the
trial court's determination that human life begins at concep-
tion,93 nor did it find any state interest compelling enough to
justify a court order of implantation against the will of either
party.94 Accordingly, the court held that Mary Sue and Junior
held a joint interest in the pre-embryos, with equal control
over their disposition.95
In reaching its decision, the appellate court cited the first
IVF dispute brought to trial, York v. Jones.96 In York, a cou-
ple who initiated an IVF procedure in Virginia sought to com-
pel the transfer of their single remaining cryopreserved pre-
embryo to an institute in California, where the couple had
relocated.97 The York court applied contract and property law
principles in resolving the dispute, finding that a bailor-bailee
relationship existed between the Yorks and the Virginia
clinic.98 In reaching its decision, the court relied on the fact
that the consent form the Yorks signed referred to the stored
embryos as "property" throughout.99 The court held that since
the prospect of implantation, the purpose of the bailment, had
ceased to exist, the clinic was obligated to release the pre-
embryo as the Yorks desired.'00
By relying on York, the Davis appellate court arguably
aligned itself with an "embryo as property" viewpoint,' and
92. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (Tenn. Sept. 13, 1990),
affld, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 507
U.S. 911 (1993).
93. See id.
94. See id. "[Als embryos develop, they are accorded more respect than
mere human cells because of their burgeoning potential for human life. But,
even after viability, they are not given legal status equivalent to that of a per-
son already born." Id.
95. See id. at *3.
96. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
97. See id. at 422.
98. See id. at 425.
99. See id. at 424. For example, one portion of the agreement stipulated
that "in the event of a divorce, we understand legal ownership of any stored pre-
zygotes must be determined in a property settlement and will be released as di-
rected by order of a court of competent jurisdiction." Id.
100. See id. at 425.
101. See Trespalacios, supra note 84, at 813.
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shifted the focus from concentrating on the rights of pre-
embryos to concentrating on the rights of the gamete do-
nors."' This at least marked a strong departure from the
status of personhood attributed to pre-embryos by the Davis
trial court."3 In considering, and then rejecting, the "embryo
as person" view, the Davis appellate court recognized the con-
flict with constitutional law inherent in deciding that a cryo-
genically preserved embryo is a human being.0 4
However, the Davis appellate court decision has been the
subject of criticism for several reasons. First, in relying on
York, the appellate court failed to consider that the basis for
the York holding rested not primarily on the categorization of
the pre-embryos as property, but instead on the analysis of an
existing contract between the parties."' Second, York is dis-
tinguishable in that it did not involve a divorce; the issue in
York was not the resolution of ownership of the embryos as
between the couple themselves, but between a couple and a
clinic.0 6 Third, the decision at the Davis appellate level has
been criticized as inconsistent with property law, since in di-
vorce cases joint property is usually divided equally between
the parties, not subjected to joint ownership as were the em-
bryos in Davis.' °7 Finally, the appellate ruling arguably
vested control of the embryos in Junior."8 Since he was the
party seeking to avoid procreation, the court of appeals essen-
tially awarded Junior veto power over Mary Sue's desire to
either implant or donate,0 9 thereby granting him exclusive
control over the disposition of the embryos."0
102. See id. at 813.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 71-81.
104. "[The U.S. Supreme Court] has clearly held that an individual has a
right to prevent procreation." Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2
(Tenn. Sept. 13, 1990), affd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.
Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993) (citing Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 685 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
105. See Trespalacios, supra note 84, at 816.
106. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596 (calling the appellate court's reliance on
York "troublesome" for this reason).
107. See Trespalacios, supra note 84, at 816. Some commentators have in-
terpreted the appellate court's holding as awarding joint custody. See, e.g.,
Mark Curriden, Joint Custody of the Frozen Seven, ABA J., Dec. 1990, at 36.
108. See Trespalacios, supra note 84, at 817.
109. "In reality, such joint custody grants a veto power to one parent over the
other's child-rearing decisions." Id. (citing Chamberlin, Joint Custody: Its Legis-




E. Davis v. Davis at the State Supreme Court: The "Neither
Person nor Property" View
The Supreme Court of Tennessee took a third route in in-
terpreting how to resolve the disposition of the Davis' pre-
embryos. First, the court rejected the trial court's finding
that embryos are "people," referring to Dr. Lejeune's testi-
mony as reflecting "a profound confusion between science and
religion."11' The court then adopted the American Fertility
Society's term "pre-embryo" to describe the fertilized ova in
the Davis case."'
Next, the supreme court noted that because the court of
appeals cited York v. Jones"' in reaching its decision, it "left
the implication that [the Davises' interest in the pre-embryos]
is in the nature of a property interest."' Instead of aligning
itself with the "embryo as property" view,"' however, the su-
preme court criticized the appellate court for implying that
the pre-embryos were property"6 and expressed concern that
the appellate decision did not "give adequate guidance to the
trial court in the event that the parties did not agree.""7
In seeking to define the nature of the Davises' interest in
the pre-embryos, the supreme court aligned itself with the
guidelines of the American Fertility Society,"8 which submit-
ted an amicus curiae brief in the case."9 The court declared
that "pre-embryos are not, strictly speaking, either 'persons'
or 'property' but occupy an interim category that entitles
them to special respect because of their potential for human
life.""' The court concluded, therefore, that although Mary
Sue and Junior did not have a "true property interest," the
nature of their interest was one that vested in them a shared
decision-making authority in determining the disposition of
111. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 593.
112. See id. at 594. "Admittedly, this distinction is not dispositive in the case
before us. It deserves emphasis only because inaccuracy can lead to misanalysis
such as occurred at the trial level in this case." Id.
113. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).
114. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 101-10.
116. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596.
117. Id. at 590. "[T]here is no formula in the court of appeals opinion for de-
termining the outcome if the parties cannot reach an agreement in the future."
Id. at 598.
,118. See id. at 596.
119. See id. at 589.
120. Id. at 597.
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the pre-embryos.' Although the Davises in this case did not
have an agreement concerning the disposition of the pre-
embryos,22 the court nonetheless proposed that generally,
such agreements should be presumed valid and strictly en-
forced.'23
Because no such agreement existed in Davis, the su-
preme court was forced to decide the case on other grounds.
The court first considered, and then rejected, arguments
based on implied contract and reliance espoused by some
scholarly articles.24 The court then proposed a balancing test
in order to resolve the dispute, weighing the state's interest in
potential human life against Mary Sue and Junior's procrea-
tional autonomy.2 ' The court described procreational auton-
omy as consisting of both the right to procreate and the right
to avoid procreation, each of which deserved equal weight.'26
The court reasoned that since the state's interest in fetal life
in abortion cases' does not become compelling until long af-
ter the stage of development attained by the pre-embryos in
the Davis dispute,' the state's interest failed to outweigh the
Davises' interest in procreational autonomy.'29
The supreme court then balanced Junior's desire to avoid
procreation against Mary Sue's desire to donate the pre-
embryos to an infertile couple. 3 ' In considering the impact of
unwanted parenthood on Junior, the court gave weight to
Junior's testimony regarding the childhood trauma imposed
upon him by his parents' divorce.' Having been raised with
121. See id.
122. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 598.
123. See id. at 597, 604.
124. The implied contract argument in Davis was that Mary Sue and Junior
had an implied contract to reproduce via IVF and that since Mary Sue had re-
lied on that contract, it should be enforced against Junior. See id. at 598. The
court concluded that the reliance theory was inappropriate since Mary Sue no
longer wanted to implant the embryos in her own uterus, but instead wished to
donate them. See id. For an in-depth discussion in support of the implied con-
tract argument, see Trespalacios, supra note 84.
125. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 603.
126. See id. at 601.
127. Specifically, the court considered Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). See Davis, 842
S.W.2d. at 601.
128. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
129. See id. at 602.
130. See id. at 603.
131. See id. at 603-04.
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largely absent parents,3 ' Junior was "vehemently opposed to
fathering a child that would not live with both parents."'
The intensity of Junior's opposition was not diminished in
considering donation of the pre-embryos to an infertile couple,
since Junior feared the possibility that the recipient couple
might subsequently divorce, leaving "his" child in a single-
parent household.3
In light of this testimony, the supreme court held that
Mary Sue's interest in donating the pre-embryos was not suf-
ficient to overcome Junior's "lifetime of either wondering
about his parental status or knowing about his parental
status but having no control over it."3 5 The court gave some
weight to the trauma Mary Sue experienced in undergoing
IVF 36 and the burden she would suffer in knowing that the
procedures were ultimately futile because the pre-embryos
would never become children.'37 However, the court felt that
even if Mary Sue sought to implant the pre-embryos in her-
self, the result would most likely be the same given that, in
the court's opinion, Mary Sue had a reasonable opportunity
either to repeat the VF procedure or to adopt.
3 8
The supreme court summarized its ruling in the Davis
case by providing a step-by-step analysis for the adjudication
of disputes over IVF-produced pre-embryos. Initially, courts
should look to agreements reached between the parties.9 If
no such agreement exists, courts should balance the relative
interests of the parties in using or destroying the pre-
132. Junior testified that when he was five years old, his parents divorced
and his mother had a nervous breakdown. He and three of his brothers went to
live at a home for boys run by the Lutheran Church. From then on he had
monthly visits with his mother, but only saw his father three times before his
father died in 1976. See id at 603.
133. Id. at 604.
134. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. Junior testified that he would "definitely"
consider a child that was born to the recipient couple as his own. Id.
135. Id.
136. The proposition that since a woman makes a greater physical and emo-
tional investment in the LVF procedure, and should therefore retain control over
the resulting embryos, is referred to as the "sweat-equity" model. See John A.
Robertson, Resolving Disputes Over Frozen Embryos, 19 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 7
(1989).
137. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
138. See id. Mary Sue had remarried at this point in the litigation, and the
court looked to the fact that she and Junior had at one time pursued adoption as
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embryos.14 In cases where the party wishing to use the pre-
embryos has a reasonable opportunity to have a child through
alternate means, the balancing test should favor the party
seeking to avoid procreation."' If no such reasonable alterna-
tives exist, "the argument in favor of using the pre-embryos
... should be considered."'42 Finally, in cases where the party
seeking to control the disposition of the pre-embryos wishes
merely to donate them, the party wishing to avoid procreation
"obviously has the greater interest and should prevail."" The
United States Supreme Court denied Mary Sue's writ of cer-
tiorari without comment,4 4 effectively embracing the Tenne-
see Supreme Court decision.
4 5
F. Developments Since Davis v. Davis
The latest case involving a preexisting contractual IVF
agreement between the parties has, at its highest state court
level, supported the Davis Supreme Court's presumption of
validity.'46 Kass v. Kass,'47 like Davis, involved a dispute be-
tween a divorcing couple over the disposition of their cryopre-
served pre-embryos.'48 However, in Kass, the New York cou-
ple signed an informed consent form prior to the IVF
procedure that specified in the event of a divorce the pre-
embryos should be donated to the IVF program for research.49
Nevertheless, Maureen Kass brought an action seeking sole
custody of the five pre-embryos so that she could undergo an-
other implantation procedure."' Steven Kass counterclaimed
for specific performance of the consent agreement, seeking to




143. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
144. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
145. See Feliciano, supra note 48, at 321.
146. Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554 (1998) (holding that an informed consent




149. See id. at 560. The Kass agreement read, in pertinent part: "In the
event that we... are unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of our
stored pre-zygotes ... our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF pro-




clinic for research.15 1
The New York trial court reasoned that "a female par-
ticipant in IVF procedure has exclusive decisional authority
over the fertilized eggs created through that process, just as a
pregnant woman has exclusive decisional authority over a
nonviable fetus,""2 and granted custody of the embryos to
Maureen."3  However, the appellate division reversed, con-
cluding that a woman's right to privacy and bodily integrity
are not factors prior to implantation."' Instead, the court
unanimously determined that when the parties to an IVF
procedure have agreed to the disposition of resulting pre-
embryos, their agreement should control."' The court of ap-
peals affirmed this decision."6
The power given to the original agreement between the
parties has found support in the existing statutory law of one
state, Florida,"7 and pending legislation in New York"8 and
New Jersey."9 At the time of the Kass decision, only Florida's
legislation required couples undergoing IVF to execute writ-
ten agreements providing for the disposition of pre-embryos
in the event of death, divorce, or other unforeseen circum-
stances. 6 ° Since Kass, New York and New Jersey have pro-
posed similar legislation, also requiring couples to specify the
disposition of their pre-embryos before undergoing IVFT'
However, emphasis on the contractual arrangement be-
tween the parties may carry with it additional problems in
resolving disputes. One problem is that the agreement may
itself be somehow lacking, and therefore open to debate and
interpretation. The appellate division panel in Kass, while
agreeing that the informed consent document should control,
split over whether the particular agreement signed by the
Kasses was too ambiguous to effectively determine the dispo-
151. See id.




156. See id. The court of appeals is the highest state court in New York.
157. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1998) (stating couples must execute a
written agreement specifying disposition of pre-embryos in event of death, di-
vorce, or other unforeseen circumstances).
158. S.B. 1120, 222d Leg. (N.Y. 1999).
159. A.B. 2478, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1999).
160. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1998).
161. See S.B. 1120, 222d Leg. (N.Y. 1999); A.B. 2478, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1999).
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sition of their pre-embryos.'62 Significantly, the opinions of
the concurring and dissenting justices resolved the ambiguity
problem by echoing the balancing test used in Davis.6 '
The scholarly commentary surrounding the debate over
the disposition of pre-embryos has also proffered a variety of
solutions, most of which fall within the contract/balancing
test penumbra. Some commentators advocate automatically
granting control over the pre-embryos to the party wishing to
avoid procreation. 6 4 Others endorse automatically granting
control to the woman when she desires to implant.' Still
others view participation in an IVF program as an implied
contract to procreate which should be enforceable despite
events such as divorce.'66
The debate rages in the context of a dearth of legislation.
While research on human embryos is highly controlled,'67 IVF
clinics themselves remain largely unregulated. 6 ' The only
current federal legislation aimed at regulating IVF clinics re-
quires only that the clinics report statistics such as success
rate, ' 69 and even this regulation has been slow to take hold.7 °
Essentially, by adopting a hands-off approach, the federal
government has left discretion over IVF regulation to the
states.17' Thus far, the states have largely echoed the federal
government's unwillingness to legislate. Only four states,
Louisiana,'72 Florida,'73 New York, 74 and New Hampshire,'75
162. See Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 561 (1998).
163. The concurring justice would have tipped the balance in favor of the ob-
jecting party considering "the emotional and financial burdens of compelled
parenthood." Id. The dissenting justices would have remanded to the trial
court for more fact-finding in order to facilitate a fair balancing of the parties'
respective interests. See id.
164. See, e.g., Robert Poole, Allocation of Decision-Making Rights to Frozen
Embryos, 4 AM. J. FAM. L. 67 (1990).
165. See, e.g., Jeff L. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOY. L.
REV. 357 (1986).
166. See, e.g., Feliciano, supra note 48; Trespalacios, supra note 84.
167. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 651.
168. See id.
169. The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 legislated
that clinics performing IVF report the exact numbers of procedures performed
and the resulting number of live births occurring. 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7
(1994).
170. Andrews, supra note 2, at 651. The first success rate report was not
published until December, 1997. See id.
171. See Fiandaca, supra note 3, at 381.
172. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-:133 (West 1997) (stating that a pre-
embryo is considered a "juridical person" that must be implanted).
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have either proposed or passed legislation directed specifi-
cally at resolving the disposition of pre-embryos generated by
IVF.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The range of decisions in Davis v. Davis is indicative of
the difficulty courts have in categorizing the nature of IVF-
produced embryos and resolving disputes as to their appro-
priate disposition.'76 Whether a court chooses to view these
embryos as persons, as property, or as neither has a profound
effect on the rights of IVF participants, on the outcome of fu-
ture disputes, and on the ART industry as a whole. As IVF
technology advances, more disputes will likely arise, forcing
more courts to address the problem. Further, due to the lack
of adjudicated cases in most states, courts may continually
face IVF disputes as matters of first impression. This may
lead to the type of confusion and reversal of decisions seen in
Davis. States therefore may have an interest in adopting one
of the views regarding the proper categorization of IVF-
produced embryos, and legislating accordingly, to effectuate a
more efficient and standardized approach to resolving future
disputes. The question then becomes which approach best fa-
cilitates effective, fair, and standardized resolutions to the
problem of frozen embryo disposition, and how to best imple-
ment that approach.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Embryos as Persons
Deciding that an embryo is a human being from the mo-
ment of conception and deserves protection whether or not it
is implanted in a woman's uterus, as the Louisiana legisla-
ture77 and the Davis trial court 78 did, is appealing. Those
who believe that life begins at fertilization may have few al-
173. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1999) (requiring couples to execute a
written agreement specifying disposition of pre-embryos in event of death, di-
vorce, or other unforeseen circumstances).
174. S.B. 1120, 222d Leg. (N.Y. 1999).
175. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:13-:15, :18 (West 1999) (limiting ex utero
maintenance of pre-embryos to 14 days).
176. Feliciano, supra note 48, at 314-15.
177. See supra text accompanying note 80.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 71-81.
19991 275
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
ternatives for protecting embryos and allowing them the op-
portunity to be born. Frozen embryos essentially face only
five prospective futures: implantation in the woman whose
eggs gave rise to them, implantation in another woman
through donation or surrogacy, use for research purposes, de-
struction, or storage, which, if continued too long, may be-
come the equivalent of destruction.179 Requiring implantation
of all IVF embryos assures that they will at least have the
opportunity to be brought to term, instead of being subjected
to research, storage, or destruction.
However, the implications of this perspective are pro-
found.8 ° First, requiring the implantation of all IVF embryos
necessarily requires IVF clinics to find a "home" for each em-
bryo generated through the procedure. Every embryo must
therefore be tracked and placed accordingly. If the gamete
donors no longer wish to use the embryos themselves, the
embryos must be donated to another couple for implantation.
This leaves gamete donors with a potentially disturbing
choice: either continue to implant their embryos despite their
wishes to the contrary or have their genetic "children" born to
other couples. 8'
Second, categorizing embryos as human beings brings
with it the necessity of allocating to them not just the right to
be implanted but a whole panoply of legal rights,'82 which may
directly conflict with existing law.'83 For example, a court's
determination that an embryo has a right to be implanted
may mean that women who undergo IVF could be forced to
implant all of the embryos that result from the procedure, re-
gardless of their wishes.' This result directly conflicts with a
woman's right to privacy and bodily integrity under Roe v.
Wade. 8' Further, since Roe and Casey refused to recognize
gestating embryos as human beings prior to viability,16
179. There is some disagreement about the maximum length of storage for
pre-embryos. See Trespalacios, supra note 84, at 817 n.98.
180. See Cucci, supra note 10, at 434.
181. The moral difficulty with having one's genetic children raised by strang-
ers was essentially the problem faced by Junior Davis when Mary Sue wished to
donate their pre-embryos to an infertile couple. See supra text accompanying
notes 135-38.
182. See Trespalacios, supra note 84, at 807.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
186. Viability has been defined as the ability of a fetus to exist independently
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granting rights to IVF embryos would essentially create two
"classes" of embryos. Those which have been implanted or
conceived naturally but are not yet viable would have no
rights, whereas those which are arrested at the four- to eight-
cell stage would be accorded all the rights that accompany le-
gal recognition as a "person.' 87
Third, requiring implantation does not guarantee a birth
will result. Given the low success rate of IVF,'88 at most four-
teen percent of frozen embryos will come to term after im-
plantation. This figure is potentially much lower for embryos
that have been stored for some time.9 The low success rate
raises the question of whether creating the embryos in the
first place should be allowed,'9 ° since by fertilizing eggs in vi-
tro, clinics thereby sentence resulting embryos to a far less
likely chance of being born than through normal coital repro-
duction.'
Finally, requiring implantation of all embryos may lead
to an implementation nightmare. The Davis trial court deci-
sion9 ' and the Louisiana statute'93 leave unresolved the ques-
tion of who should bear the burden of ensuring that each em-
bryo is implanted.' Placing this burden on IVF clinics
requires imposing a regulatory scheme far beyond that which
is required today, perhaps necessitating a review board whose
function it is to track embryos and ensure that all are given
an opportunity to gestate. While the imposition of a regula-
tory scheme may not in itself be unduly burdensome,19 task-
ing clinics with finding recipient hosts for every IVF-produced
outside the womb. Id. at 159.
187. See Trespalacios, supra note 84, at 807.
188. See Winston & Handyside, supra note 28, at 932.
189. See id.
190. In fact, the Vatican has expressed an outright condemnation of IVF en-
tirely. See Glieck, supra note 79, at A16.
191. See Winston & Handyside, supra note 28, at 932. At most, 60% of natu-
rally conceived early pregnancies are lost, compared to the overall 86% failure
rate of TVF pregnancies. See id.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 71-81.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 80, 172.
194. At least one commentator has suggested that the Louisiana statute is
likely to face a constitutional challenge in the near future due to the vagueness
of its interpretation. See Cucci, supra note 10, at 438.
195. Many commentators, especially in the scientific community, agree that
some form of regulatory scheme is long overdue in the ART industry. See, e.g.,
Andrews, supra note 2.
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embryo may be unrealistic.'96 Placing the burden of implanta-
tion on the female gamete donor, as addressed above, is a di-
rect violation of her constitutional rights to privacy and bodily
integrity.'97 Placing the burden on the male gamete donor re-
quires that if the female donor refuses to implant, he must
find another female who is willing to act as a surrogate and
carry all the embryos to term. Given all of the above compli-
cations, and conflicts with existing law, the "embryos as per-
sons" view is probably the least compelling, and the most dif-
ficult to implement.
B. Embryos as Property
Viewing embryos as property similarly poses both legal
and implementation problems. In theory, this viewpoint ap-
pears attractive since it holds the promise of a simple, bright
line resolution founded on the principles of an already well-
developed area of law. By designating embryos as property,
courts can apply appropriate property law principles to decide
a given case. This may be useful in cases such as York, in
which the point of contention rests on a theory of conversion
or of detinue. 98
However, the "embryo as property" theory becomes more
complex and difficult to implement in the context of divorce
cases such as Kass 99 and Davis.00 If embryos are property,
then they are subject to a typical property division,"°' with
each party entitled to a portion of the total number of em-
bryos. However, vesting complete control over any of the em-
bryos in either party logically leads to the same problems pre-
sented by requiring implantation, especially in cases in which
one party desires to implant and the other does not. For ex-
ample, if the embryos in the Davis case were divided in a tra-
ditional property settlement, Mary Sue would retain control
196. This may be especially true in light of the allegations against clinics of
mishandling IVF procedures. See id.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
198. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). See supra text accom-
panying notes 96-100.
199. Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554 (1998). See supra text accompanying notes
149-60.
200. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), afrd, 842
S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911
(1993).
201. See Trespalacios, supra note 84, at 816.
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over a certain number of the embryos. She would therefore
have the authority to implant or donate the embryos in her
possession despite the wishes of Junior. This result logically
leads to the same debate over Junior's right not to procreate
raised when the trial court granted Mary Sue control over all
of the embryos." '
Some scholars criticize the appellate decision in Davis as
inconsistent with property law,' since in divorce cases courts
usually divide joint property equally between the parties,
whereas the Davis appellate decision ostensibly subjected the
embryos to joint ownership."4 Instead of dividing the em-
bryos between the parties, the appellate court granted joint
control of the embryos to both Mary Sue and Junior, with
"equal voice over their disposition." 5 This holding has been
likened more closely to a joint custody arrangement than a
traditional property division.0 6
The problem with a joint control arrangement over em-
bryos is that it necessarily leads to an inequality between the
parties in exercising control. ' Since the embryos cannot be
implanted unless both parties agree, the party resisting im-
plantation necessarily holds a "veto power"' 8 over the wishes
of the party desiring implantation. 9 Further, since the em-
bryos cannot be stored indefinitely without degrading,10 the
resisting party need only withhold consent long enough to
have the final say in the matter.' Eventually, the embryos
will have been stored so long that they will no longer be use-
ful, and the resisting party will, in effect, have prevailed.22
Therefore, in cases where one party desires implantation and
the other does not, there is arguably no meaningful difference
between joint control and an outright grant to the party
seeking to prevent implantation.'
Finally, the sole precedent categorizing pre-embryos as
202. See supra text accompanying notes 135-45.
203. See Trespalacios, supra note 84, at 816.
204. See id.
205. See Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2.




210. See supra note 182.
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property is itself subject to question.214 The Davis appellate
court, in relying on York as precedent, failed to recognize that
the York decision was based primarily on an analysis of an
existing contract between the parties.215 Therefore, no case on
record has determined the disposition of pre-embryos solely
on a property law basis. Thus, the "embryo as property" view,
like the "embryo as person" view, is not the most compelling
argument for the appropriate resolution of IVF embryo dispo-
sition.
C. Embryos as Neither Persons nor Property
The viewpoint that embryos are neither persons nor
property, as embraced by the Davis supreme court decision,"'
is perhaps the most workable solution to the problem of char-
acterizing IVF-produced embryos. 7  The U.S. Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari without comment in the Davis
case suggests support for the Tennessee Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of the nature of IVF embryos."8
In analyzing the implications of the Davis state supreme
court decision, two separate holdings emerge. First, where an
agreement between the parties undergoing IVF exists, that
agreement should control. 9 Second, absent such an agree-
ment, the court should apply a balancing test to determine
which party has a superior interest.2
Placing emphasis on the contractual agreement entered
into by the gamete donors is compelling for a number of rea-
sons. First, the original contract arguably best exemplifies
the expectations and wishes of each party at the time he or
she decided to undergo the IVF procedure. Second, such a
contract is readily included within the context of informed
consent.221 Since clinics stand to reap a financial benefit from
IVF patients,2 it is arguably a minimal burden on such clin-
214. See supra text accompanying notes 105-10.
215. See Trespalacios, supra note 84, at 816.
216. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom.
Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
217. See id.
218. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 139-45.
220. See id.
221. For example, the agreement in the Kass dispute was included as part of
the informed consent signed by the Kasses when they originally decided to un-
dergo IVF. See supra text accompanying notes 149-60.
222. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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ics to require a stipulation of disposition as part of their gen-
eral informed consent procedure. Third, the process of form-
ing the contract forces each party to clearly articulate his or
her desires for the disposition of embryos; a contract that is
included as part of informed consent may force the parties to
recognize and allow for contingencies that they had not previ-
ously considered. Fourth, looking to the original agreement
allows for a bright-line rule in determining the outcome of
cases in which the disposition of embryos is at issue.22
However, because IVF clinics are largely unregulated,"4
emphasis on the contractual arrangement between the par-
ties carries with it some problems in resolving disputes.
Clinics may have no incentive, aside from self-protection, to
encourage the parties to sign a contract.2 5 Accordingly, the
contracts may vary in effectiveness or comprehensiveness
from clinic to clinic. There may be no contract at all, as in
Davis,"' or if there is a contract, it may be found somehow
lacking, and therefore open to debate and interpretation.227
The vulnerability of the contract to dispute is evidenced by
the judicial rift in Kass.28 The appellate division panel in
Kass, while unanimously agreeing that the informed consent
document should control, 9 split over whether the particular
agreement signed by the Kasses was too ambiguous to effec-
tively determine the disposition of the pre-embryosY °
Precisely because of either missing or vulnerable IVF
contracts, the court in Davis and concurring judges in Kass
turned to balancing tests.2"' The use of a balancing test can
therefore be seen as a secondary choice, where there has been
some problem with the IVF contract that renders the disposi-
tion of the embryos unclear.
Arguably, if all couples were required to sign contracts
specifying the future disposition of their embryos as under
223. See supra text accompanying notes 122-23.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 13-19.
225. Or, as in the Davis dispute, a clinic may simply neglect to follow proce-
dure and the parties may never be presented with a contract to sign. See supra
text accompanying note 66.
226. See id.
227. Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554 (1998).
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.; see also supra note 162.
231. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub
nom. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993); see also Kass, 91 N.Y.2d at 561.
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Florida state law,2"' and those contracts were well-drafted,
there would be no need to turn to a balancing test to resolve
disputes. Since each couple entering into an IVF agreement
would have already stipulated to the disposition of their pre-
embryos in advance, there would be no need for courts to look
outside of the original contract for an equitable resolution to a
disagreement between the parties.
Further, an enforceable IVF contract has the added ad-
vantage of flexibility, taking into consideration the unique
views and beliefs of any given couple. Therefore, this ap-
proach is not necessarily in conflict with either the person or
property view of embryos since contracts would allow couples
to specify their wishes themselves. For example, if a couple
believes strongly that pre-embryos constitute life,2"' they may
accordingly decide either not to undergo the procedure, not to
freeze additional embryos, or to donate their extra embryos to
an infertile couple. If a couple believes the embryos are prop-
erty,"' they may decide in advance how that property is to be
handled in the event of death, divorce, or other unforeseen
circumstances. Perhaps most importantly, requiring a con-
tract means that unless couples are able to agree about the
disposition of their embryos, they will not be able to partici-
pate in IVF at all. This effectively places the burden of re-
solving disputes in the hands of the couple, in advance of the
procedure, instead of at the feet of a court after embryos have
already been created and stored.
V. PROPOSAL
As long as couples continue to turn to IVF as a means of
overcoming infertility, and as long as clinics continue to offer
cryopreservation of pre-embryos as an alternative to repeated
aspirations and transfers,2 5 courts will repeatedly address the
problem of how to resolve ownership disputes over those pre-
embryos. Further, with technological advancements in the
ART industry, the use of IVF will only increase. States there-
fore have an interest in adopting legislation in order to en-
sure fair and efficient resolution of disputes over cryopre-
served embryos.
232. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 203-07.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
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The decision as to how pre-embryos should be treated or
divided should a divorce, death, or other unforeseen circum-
stance occur rests more appropriately with the parties who
seek to undergo the lVF procedure than with the courts.
Therefore, the best resolution to the problem of the disposi-
tion of pre-embryos is through legislation similar to that
adopted in Florida: 36 requiring a contract before the IVF pro-
cedure is performed. Every couple undergoing IVF should be
required, as part of the informed consent agreement signed
with their clinic, to comprehensively stipulate to the disposi-
tion of any embryos resulting from the procedure. 37 IVF
clinics should, in turn, be barred from performing in vitro fer-
tilization unless both gamete donors sign such an agreement
in advance of the procedure.38
Further, the contracts used by IVF clinics should be
standardized so that the language is clear and not open to de-
bate. Clear and consistent language would prevent problems
of interpretation that would otherwise arise due to variations
in contracts from clinic to clinic, 39 and obviate the need for
complex and potentially subjective secondary measures such
as judicial balancing tests.24°
VI. CONCLUSION
The ability to create and store human embryos through
in vitro fertilization and cryopreservation has brought with it
not only a promise of hope to infertile couples, but also a host
of moral, ethical, and legal problems. In cases tried in the
United States to date, 41 courts settle disputes over the dispo-
sition of frozen embryos when couples disagree about the fu-
ture of the embryos.242 Whether courts view cryopreserved
embryos as persons, property, or neither has a profound effect
on the outcome of cases where the disposition of frozen em-
bryos is in dispute."3
236. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997).
237. See id.
238. This proposition is not included in the Florida statute. See id.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 231-34.
240. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub
nom. Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993); see also Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554,
561 (1998).
241. See supra Part II.B-E.
242. See supra Part II.B.
243. See id.
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Part IV of this comment analyzes the implications of
adopting each of these views of frozen embryos, and their po-
tential impact on gamete donors, IVF clinics, and the embryos
themselves.4 This comment contends that the "neither per-
sons nor property" view of embryos leads to the most equita-
ble resolution of disputes. Under this theory, courts defer to
contractual agreements entered into by the parties seeking to
undergo IVF.45 Part V suggests that states adopt legislation
requiring couples to stipulate to the disposition of their em-
bryos in the event of a divorce or disagreement before they
are allowed to participate in IVF.246 Part V additionally pro-
poses that under the suggested legislation clinics be barred
from performing the IVF procedure on couples who have not
signed such agreements. Further, the agreements should be
standardized in order to most effectively resolve disputes. 7
In the pursuit of equitable and efficient resolutions to prob-
lems of embryo disposition, unless well-drafted IVF contracts
are uniformly required and enforced, states, like Thursday's
child,4 8 have far to go.
244. See supra Part IV.
245. See supra Part IV.C.
246. See supra Part V.
247. See id.
248. See supra note t.
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